Online safety & content laws in Cuba (2026)

Legal framework

Decree Law 35 on Telecommunications/ICT (2021); Law 162/2023 on Social Communication (in force October 2024); Decree 370; ETECSA state monopoly on connectivity

Key points: internet & online safety in Cuba

1. 01Decree Law 35 (2021)

   Enacted in August 2021 after mass protests, Decree Law 35 obliges telecommunications providers to interrupt, suspend, or terminate service for users who publish content deemed 'fake', offensive to 'public morality', contrary to 'constitutional, social and economic precepts of the State', or inciting public disorder, with no requirement for judicial authorisation. Companion Resolutions 105, 107, and 108 govern cybersecurity and network use.

   hrw.org cpj.org

2. 02Social Communication Law (2024)

   Law 162/2023 was published in Official Gazette No. 48 on 5 June 2024 and entered into force on 4 October 2024. It regulates media, community, and cyberspace spheres and contains vague content restrictions applicable to online speech. By November 2024 the government had accredited 'social communication inspectors' empowered to monitor and enforce compliance online.

   plenglish.com rsf.org en.cibercuba.com

3. 03ETECSA monopoly and access restrictions

   ETECSA is Cuba's sole mobile telecommunications provider, fully state-owned, and serves as the primary enforcement mechanism for internet censorship. In May 2025 ETECSA imposed unprecedented caps on ordinary data plans (360 CUP per 30-day period, barely sufficient for a 6 GB package) at prices far exceeding the monthly minimum wage, further restricting practical access.

   en.cibercuba.com freedomhouse.org

4. 04Selective platform blocking and shutdowns

   Authorities have repeatedly ordered ETECSA to block social media platforms and messaging apps during periods of civil unrest. The Freedom on the Net 2025 report noted that while major platforms were not wholesale-blocked during the 2024-25 coverage period (a marginal improvement), independent news websites remain systematically blocked, and some messaging apps showed signs of intermittent blocking.

   freedomhouse.org freedomhouse.org

5. 05Criminal penalties for online speech

   Decree Law 35 and Decree 370 are routinely used to prosecute online expression. In January 2025, Félix Daniel Pérez Ruiz was sentenced to five years imprisonment for a Facebook post criticising the government and calling for a public demonstration. The government also banned the import of unregistered satellite-linked devices and seized many such devices in March 2025.

   freedomhouse.org therecord.media

6. 06No independent platform-liability or age-verification regime

   Cuba has no framework analogous to the EU Digital Services Act or UK Online Safety Act. There is no independent regulator, no user rights-based content-moderation regime, and no formal age-verification framework; instead, all content obligations flow downward from the Communist Party-aligned state to the monopoly ISP, with no avenue for platform challenge or user appeal.

   oas.org freedomhouse.org

Timeline of decisions

1. 1 Jan 2025Enforcement
   5-Year Prison Sentence for Facebook Post Criticizing Government

   Félix Daniel Pérez Ruiz was sentenced to five years in prison for a Facebook post criticizing the government and calling for a public demonstration. The case exemplifies routine enforcement of Cuba's layered online-speech laws against ordinary social media users.

   Freedom House – Freedom on the Net 2025

2. 1 Dec 2022Law
   New Penal Code (Law 151/2022) Enters into Force

   Cuba's comprehensive Penal Code, adopted by the National Assembly in May 2022 and published in the Official Gazette in September 2022, came into force in December 2022. It explicitly criminalizes cybercrime offences such as 'dissemination of fake news' and 'propaganda against the constitutional order,' classifies social media use as an aggravating circumstance, and sets sentences of up to 15 years for online political speech.

   Amnesty International

3. 17 Aug 2021Law · official
   Decree-Law 35/2021 and Cybersecurity Resolutions 105/107/108 Enacted

   Published in the Official Gazette just weeks after the mass July protests, Decree-Law 35 on Telecommunications, ICT and the Radio Spectrum — paired with Resolutions 105, 107, and 108 — criminalizes sharing 'false' or 'offensive' information online and grants authorities explicit power to suspend internet and telecom services. Human Rights Watch described it as a direct legislative crackdown triggered by the protest wave.

   CUBADIPLOMATICA – Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs

4. 1 Aug 2021Law
   Decree Law 35 Imposes Broad Censorship Obligations on Telecom and Digital Service Providers

   Decree Law 35 entered into force, requiring internet service providers to remove or restrict online content without judicial oversight; while not AI-specific, it defined the restrictive digital governance environment in which all AI systems operating in Cuba must function.

   Freedom House (Freedom on the Net 2022)

5. 11 Jul 2021Incident
   Government Cuts Mobile Internet and Blocks Social Media During Mass Protests

   During Cuba's largest protests in over 60 years, ETECSA severed mobile internet access and blocked WhatsApp, Facebook, Instagram, Telegram, and Signal. Independently verified by the Internet Society Pulse and NetBlocks, the shutdown underscored that Cuba's state-controlled telecoms infrastructure can be withdrawn at any time — a fundamental risk for remote workers relying on connectivity.

   Internet Society Pulse

6. 11 Jul 2021Incident
   Social Media Blocked During Largest Anti-Government Protests Since 1994

   Following the outbreak of mass protests on 11 July 2021, state telecom ETECSA blocked WhatsApp, Facebook, Instagram, Telegram, and YouTube from 12–18 July, confirmed by NetBlocks. Over one million Cubans turned to circumvention tools such as Psiphon; the shutdown drew global condemnation and directly prompted the subsequent Decree-Law 35 legislative response.

   NetBlocks

7. 11 Jul 2021Incident
   July 11 Protests Trigger Government-Imposed Nationwide Internet Blackout

   Following unprecedented anti-government protests across Cuba, authorities directed ETECSA to cut mobile internet and social media for several days — the first large-scale documented use of a state-directed network shutdown on the island. The incident exposed the lack of any legal constraint on government access to or disruption of citizens' communications data, and directly accelerated enactment of Decree-Law 35/2021.

   Human Rights Watch

8. 11 Jul 2021Incident
   Cuba Executes Largest-Ever Internet Shutdown During Mass Protests

   As unprecedented nationwide demonstrations erupted on 11 July 2021, ETECSA cut national internet connectivity for 30 minutes then imposed rolling blocks on WhatsApp, Signal, Telegram, Facebook, and Instagram lasting up to 72 hours, the first simultaneous deployment of all censorship techniques and Cuba's most extensive digital blackout since mobile internet launched in December 2018. The shutdown, attributed to Chinese-supplied Huawei and ZTE infrastructure, triggered the subsequent legislative response in August 2021.

   Rest of World

9. 4 Jul 2019Law
   Decree-Law 370 on Informatization of Society Enters into Force

   Decree-Law 370 entered into force on 4 July 2019, prohibiting dissemination of information 'contrary to social interest, morals, good manners and integrity of people' on public networks, and barring Cubans from hosting sites on foreign servers. It became the primary instrument used to fine, detain, and confiscate equipment from independent journalists and bloggers, with at least 20 people fined and 7 imprisoned for social media posts by 2020.

   ARTICLE 19

10. 1 Jul 2019Law
    Decree-Law 370/2018 Enters Force: Online Content Against 'Social Interest' Criminalized

    Decree-Law 370, enacted in 2018 and entering force in July 2019, prohibited dissemination of information 'contrary to social interest, morals, good manners and integrity of people' and barred Cubans from hosting content solely on foreign servers. It became the primary legal tool used against activists and independent journalists for online expression prior to the broader 2021 package.

    JurisCuba

11. 1 Jan 1996Law
    Decree-Law 209: Cuba's Foundational Internet Regulation

    Decree-Law 209, enacted in 1996 concurrent with Cuba's first internet connection, prohibited internet use that violated 'Cuban society's moral principles, national security, or public order,' and authorized fines or service termination for non-compliance. It established the legal precedent of state-controlled, content-restricted internet access that all subsequent legislation has built upon.

    Wikipedia – Internet Censorship in Cuba

Sources

1. 1.freedomhouse.org/country/cuba/freedom-net/2025
2. 2.freedomhouse.org/country/cuba/freedom-net/2024
3. 3.hrw.org/news/2021/08/25/cuba-telecommunications-decree-curtails-free-speech
4. 4.cpj.org/2021/08/cuba-passes-regulations-criminalizing-online-content-further-
5. 5.plenglish.com/news/2024/10/04/social-communication-law-enters-into-force-in-cuba/
6. 6.rsf.org/en/new-digital-law-tightens-clampdown-press-freedom-cuba
7. 7.therecord.media/cuba-passes-internet-censorship-and-cybersecurity-law
8. 8.en.cibercuba.com/noticias/2025-05-30-u1-e43231-s27061-nid303973-etecsa-restringe-acces
9. 9.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?lID=1&artID=1278
10. 10.en.cibercuba.com/noticias/2024-11-26-u1-e135253-s27061-nid292765-regimen-cubano-acredi